Yanilda María González's Analysis of Policing in Latin America
Yanilda María González's Authoritarian Police in Democracy: Contested Security in Latin America (Cambridge University Press, 2020) tackles a puzzle that should be troubling to anyone who equates democratization with humane governance: why do violent, predatory, corrupt, and discriminatory police forces persist for decades after the third-wave democratic transitions that swept away other authoritarian institutions in Latin America? Her answer is striking — authoritarian policing survives not despite democracy, but largely because of how democratic politics actually works.
González treats police forces as "authoritarian enclaves" within democratic states. The book is a study of why police forces in the newly democratic Latin American countries often retain authoritarian practices even after transitions to democracy. Drawing on fieldwork in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, González argues that police reform outcomes depend less on formal democratic institutions and more on contested security governance — the ongoing political contests (between civilian governments, police leadership, and society) over who controls coercion. She develops a theory that continuity in authoritarian policing stems from institutional legacies, weak civilian oversight, and politicians' electoral incentives to avoid confronting entrenched police organizations.
She divides state coercion into two ideal types.
- Authoritarian coercion is arbitrary, weakly constrained by law, poorly subject to external accountability, and deployed to serve the interests of those in power.
- Democratic coercion, by contrast, is law-governed, externally accountable, and aimed primarily at protecting citizens. Opening the "black box" of police bureaucracies, she shows that police forces in new democracies operate as authoritarian enclaves — institutions inherited intact from dictatorship whose internal practices were never transformed. Central to her explanation is the police's structural power: those who control the means of coercion wield inordinate leverage over elected officials, who depend on them for security while fearing their capacity for obstruction, sabotage, or destabilization. This asymmetry induces politicians to accommodate rather than confront the police — an exchange relationship that entrenches the status quo.
Politicians weigh police reform like any other electoral decision. Reform carries certain costs: alienating a powerful bureaucracy with the capacity to retaliate, while offering only uncertain electoral gains. Those gains are uncertain because societal preferences over policing are fragmented along social cleavages — race and class above all. Where the burden of police violence falls on poor and minority communities while more affluent citizens demand harsh "tough on crime" approaches, no coherent electoral majority for democratic coercion exists. Politicians thus rationally maintain the status quo. Crucially, González insists this is not a failure of democracy: both persistence and reform "result from a strictly democratic political logic" — ordinary vote-seeking behaviour, not authoritarian residue.
Reform becomes likely when two factors converge as a counterweight to police structural power: first, convergence of societal preferences — when policing becomes a broad public concern cutting across class and racial lines (often triggered by egregious scandals or a shared sense that violence threatens everyone); second, robust political opposition — when competitors can credibly campaign on reform, converting it into an electoral weapon that makes inaction costly for incumbents. Combined, these factors change the electoral calculus so that pursuing democratic coercion wins votes while resisting it loses them.
González substantiates the argument through paired comparison of Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia — cases chosen for variation in outcomes despite similar legacies. Brazil illustrates persistent authoritarian coercion: São Paulo's Military Police, "the police that kills," continue lethal violence against poor young men, shielded by fragmented preferences. Argentina shows partial reform driven by episodes of preference convergence. Colombia demonstrates how war conditions and elite alignment with hardline security distort incentives. The fine-grained empirical work tracks how police bureaucracies cultivate politicians, and how segmented citizenship — some citizens deserving protection, others suspicion — maps onto the social structure.
Her work probably ranks among the best books on policing ever authored; many of her observations are on par in their brilliance with those of giants like David H. Bailey and Egon Bittner.Democracy, González shows, is necessary but nowhere near sufficient for democratic policing. The book's ultimate contribution is in the realm of political philosophy much more than it is in the domain of police studies.