a priori

Robert Reiner's Analysis of Policing in the United Kingdom

A Summary of The Politics of the Police by Robert Reiner, first published in 1985 by Harvester Wheatsheaf.

The book is on policing in the United Kingdom, from its origins in the early Nineteenth Century. The author argues that policing can never be neutral — it is shaped by, and reproduces, structured social inequality — and the British "policing by consent" tradition was a historically contingent achievement, not a permanent possession. Reiner ends soberly: neither the market nor the modernized state police can deliver security by themselves; genuine security requires tackling the political-economic roots of crime, with policing held democratically accountable. As he wrote in the third edition preface: "The police will appear more successful the less they are actually [needed to coerce]" — police succeed most where coercion is least required.

Core argument

Reiner's central claim is that policing is inherently and inescapably political. He opens by demolishing the orthodox police view that policing and politics don't mix. That view, he argues, rests on an untenably narrow definition of "the political," restricting it to party and state machinery. In a more accurate sense, all relationships with a power dimension are political, and the police are a social organisation created and sustained by political processes to enforce dominant conceptions of public order. Their distinctive role is as specialists in coercion—the bodies who hold the state's capacity to use legitimate force. The craft of good policing, following Bittner, lies precisely in minimising the actual use of that force, but the coercive capacity remains their defining feature, placing them at the very heart of the state.

Reiner draws a key distinction between partisanship in intent and partisanship in impact. Even laws formulated and enforced with scrupulous impartiality will, in a society divided by class, ethnicity and gender, reproduce those existing social divisions. So the police can be non-partisan in intent yet partisan in effect. The book is organised in three parts—history, sociology, and law/politics—moving from how the British police won legitimacy, to how they operate and are represented, to contemporary debates over powers and accountability.

Part I: History — The rise and fall of police legitimacy

Reiner reviews the historiography of the "new police" founded in 1829, positioning himself between two camps. The orthodox historians portray the police as a broadly welcomed, benign institution whose acceptance was smooth and consensual. The revisionists portray them as instruments of class domination imposed on a resistant working class. Reiner finds both inadequate and offers a synthesis. The orthodox historians wrongly ignore the rational basis of opposition to the police, which was rooted in genuinely different social interests and political philosophies; the revisionists overstate continued working-class hostility and the overtness of the police's class-control role.

His synthesis: the British police were established amid acute political conflict and massive opposition, but over roughly a century they achieved genuine legitimacy—no longer widely seen as a politically oppressive force. This consent was anchored in substantial benefits and cooperation, not mere ideological manipulation, and was won through deliberate strategies (impersonal legal authority, minimal force, cultivation of a service role, bureaucratic organisation, non-partisanship) devised by Peel, Rowan and Mayne. By the 1950s the police had become not merely accepted but "lionised," a unique symbol of national pride. Crucially, this legitimacy grew from a divided social order riven by structured conflict, not from underlying consensus—so "policing by consent" was a constructed achievement, not a natural condition. From the late 1950s onward, that legitimacy began to erode (rising crime, race riots, corruption scandals, growing conflict), a "fall" that frames the book's contemporary concerns.

Part II: Sociology — Cop culture and media images

Reiner turns to how police actually behave and how they are represented. Understanding "cop culture"—how officers see the social world and their role in it—is essential, because the rank-and-file officer, not senior command, is the primary determinant of how policing is delivered on the street through the exercise of discretion. He identifies recurring features of this occupational culture: a sense of mission (policing as a worthwhile vocation defending order), an action-centred hedonism, cynicism and pessimism, suspicion, internal solidarity paired with social isolation, conservatism, machismo, prejudice, and a pragmatic division of the world into respectable citizens and "police property." This culture develops as an adaptive response to the strains and dangers of the police role.

Reiner examines media images of policing ("mystifying the police"). He weighs two opposing perspectives—one that media should responsibly reinforce respect for law, another that treats media as propagators of a dominant ideology that sanctifies the social order and depoliticises police repression—and finds both too simple. In an unequal society, the competition to present images is structurally loaded; the weight of mass-media portrayals broadly supports the existing order and reinforces the majority's self-perceived interests. Both police and popular culture, he notes, exaggerate how far policing concerns serious crime.

Part III: Law and politics — Powers, accountability and reform

The final part addresses the politicised debates of the 1970s–80s. Reiner treats 1981 as a "climacteric" for the politicisation of policing, framed by the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (responding both to evidence of police abuse of powers and to the law-and-order lobby's complaint that suspects' rights hobbled the police) and culminating in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. He examines competing pressures: civil-libertarian demands to limit police powers and increase accountability versus police lobbying for enhanced powers and freedom from "political" control.

Conclusion

Reiner argues that British policing has passed through three phases: construction of legitimacy (mid-19th to mid-20th century, when the police became a totem of national identity), deconstruction (from the 1960s, as law-and-order became ferociously politicized and trust collapsed), and reconstruction (from the 1990s). The present phase he calls "pragmatic post-legitimation": calmer than the conflicts of the 1970s–80s, but brittle, with no return to sacred status and no room for principled debate about policing's purpose.

Reiner rejects the "transformation thesis" of the new policing school (Bayley and Shearing), which welcomes the shift from state police to a pluralized, market-based mosaic. For him, pluralization and New Public Management are "symptoms of, not solutions to, the current predicament" — consequences of neoliberalism's destabilizing and criminogenic effects, not progress. New policing theorists err by "bracketing out" political economy: any sound explanation must be multi-layered and historically grounded.

His normative conclusion is pointed. Policing is intrinsically political — a specialized monopoly of legitimate force — and can never be legitimated by efficiency or coercion alone. Echoing Tawney, he insists that power is tolerable only insofar as it is accountable to the public. "Policing by consent" was a contingent achievement, hollow for marginalized groups. Genuine security requires addressing political-economic root causes, with police subjected to real democratic accountability — the-only durable foundation of consent.